We study the role of disaggregated accounting data in the context of earnings management. Our analysis is rooted in the notion that different earnings components tend to be (noisily) proportional to each other by their fundamental economic nature. We argue that these fundamental proportions between the components of earnings are likely to be distorted by reporting manipulations. The distortion in proportions that involve an income item and an expense item is due to the managerial wish to bias incomes and expenses in opposite directions. In other cases, diversity in the managerial ability to manipulate different earnings components generates a reporting bias that distorts their original proportions. Users of financial statements can thus utilize the disaggregated earnings data in order to identify deviations of the reported earnings components from their expected fundamental proportions and thereby detect biases in reporting. Being aware of the informational role of disaggregated accounting data in indicating earnings management, firms may adopt a more cautious approach in managing their earnings reports. Our analysis, therefore, suggests that disaggregated accounting information, via its role in detecting earnings management, might serve as a powerful mechanism for suppressing misreporting incentives.
Introduction
Accounting earnings are typically the aggregation of many components, some of which have to be disclosed within the income statement, while others may be disclosed in notes to the financial statements. Though the informational content of such disaggregated accounting data is the focus of numerous studies in accounting (e.g., Lipe 1986; Rayburn 1986; Wilson 1987; Barth, Beaver and Wolfson 1990; Barth 1991; Ohlson and Penman 1992; Amir 1996; Sloan 1996; Nissim and Penman 2001; Barth, Clinch and Shibano 2003) , it has been largely ignored by the extensive literature on earnings management. Extant studies consider biases in reporting earnings mostly at the aggregated level of the reported earnings (e.g., Dye 1988; Stein 1989; Fischer and Verrecchia 2000; Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002; Fischer and Stocken 2004; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Guttman, Kadan and Kandel 2006) . By analyzing reporting manipulations at the disaggregated level of the earnings, this study explores the role that disaggregated accounting data play in the context of earnings management.
Our analysis is rooted in the notion that earnings components tend to be proportional to each other by their fundamental economic nature. Examples include the ratios that usually exist between revenues and certain expense items, such as the cost of goods sold, marketing expenses and administration expenses. Influenced as they are by changes in the business environment, such ratios are noisy in most situations. Their degree of noisiness depends on the nature of the earnings components involved, as well as on industry and firm-specific characteristics. We argue that reporting manipulations are likely to distort the fundamental proportions between the earnings components. The distortion in proportions that involve an incomes item and an expenses item is due to the managerial wish to bias incomes and expenses in opposite directions. In other cases, diversity in the managerial ability to manipulate different earnings components generates a reporting bias that distorts their original proportions.
The leeway of managers in reporting earnings within accounting conventions indeed seems to vary in its degree across different components of earnings. Due to the inherent differences in their nature, some of the earnings components are more easily managed than others. It is generally accepted, for example, that accrual-based items (such as bad debts and loss reserves, depreciations and amortizations, asset impairments) are more easily managed than cash-based items. High diversity in the managerial discretion in reporting different earnings components is also typical of segment reporting, where the consolidated earnings of a firm are decomposed into earnings from its operations in various business or geographical segments.
We demonstrate the distorting impact of reporting manipulations on the original proportions between the different components of earnings and explore its implications for the ability of users of financial statements to detect earnings management and for the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management. To do so, we model a single-period reporting game where a manager of a publicly traded firm has the ability and incentives to manage the mandatory periodical earnings reported to capital market investors. In our model, the firm's manager, whose compensation is linked to the firm's stock price, chooses a reporting strategy based on her rational expectations about the market pricing rule. The investors, in turn, invoke their rational expectations regarding the manager's reporting strategy when pricing the firm in an effort to detect earnings manipulations. Following to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) , we
incorporate an exogenous noise in the model, which does not allow investors to perfectly resolve the reporting bias in pricing the firm. Our departure from the traditional setting of earnings management is made in considering a disaggregated earnings report rather than an aggregate report.
An analysis of the equilibrium in our reporting game highlights the power of disaggregated accounting data in detecting and suppressing reporting manipulations. In equilibrium, recognizing the manager's incentives to bias incomes and expenses in opposite directions and knowing that she faces different degrees of discretion in manipulating different components of the earnings report, investors rationally infer that earnings management is likely to distort the original proportions of the earnings components. Furthermore, they can utilize the disaggregated earnings report in order to compute the actual deviation of the reported earnings components from their fundamental economic proportions. Such deviation may either stem from an economic noise that underlies the stochastic relationship between the earnings components, or result from a reporting bias. It thus provides investors with a noisy indicator of earnings management, which enables them to more accurately evaluate the firm based on the earnings report. The firm's manager, who is aware of investors' ability to utilize the reported disaggregated earnings data in order to imperfectly detect the bias in reporting, becomes more reluctant to manipulate the firm's earnings report in the first place. Our analysis, therefore, demonstrates that disaggregated accounting information, via its role in indicating reporting manipulations, might serve as an effective mechanism that suppresses managerial misreporting incentives. Utilizing a comparative statics analysis, we further show that disaggregated earnings information is more effective in detecting and suppressing earnings management when it consists of items that are fundamentally more tightly proportional to each other. The analysis also points to the merits of disaggregating earnings into pure-incomes and pureexpenses components or alternatively decomposing earnings into items that are very diverse in the extent to which their reporting can be managed.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section models the reporting game. The equilibrium in this game is derived and analyzed in Section 3, demonstrating the role of disaggregated accounting data in detecting and suppressing reporting manipulations. In an attempt to provide accounting standard setters with useful guidance in selecting among alternative disaggregating accounting procedures, Section 4 considers the sensitivity of the equilibrium outcomes to the main modeling parameters. In Section 5, we discuss the empirical implications of our study. The final section summarizes and offers concluding remarks. Proofs appear in the appendix.
Model
In this section, we present a rational expectations model, which describes a singleperiod reporting game between a manager of a publicly traded firm and investors in the capital market. The manager of the firm, whose compensation is linked to the price at which the firm is traded in the market, exercises discretion over the costly bias in the earnings reported to the investors. In designing the model, we built on the earnings management setup of Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) . We deviate from their model by considering a disaggregated earnings report rather than an aggregate earnings report. This allows us to flush out the important role of accounting disaggregation in the context of earnings management. The remainder of this section details the parameters and assumptions underlying the model, which are all assumed to be common knowledge unless otherwise indicated.
We consider a firm that is traded in a capital market for one period. The earnings that the firm yields during the given period constitute its equity value. Investors are assumed to be rational and risk-neutral. Accordingly, they set the firm's market price equal to the firm's expected value conditional on all the available information. In particular, they use their expectations about the manager's reporting strategy in an effort to detect the reporting bias and thereby most effectively utilize the information conveyed in the 5 Following Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) , uncertainty on the part of investors about the reporting objective of managers is widely assumed in the disclosure literature (e.g., Fischer and Stocken 2004; Dye and Sridhar 2004; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Einhorn 2007 ). Such uncertainty is modeled by assuming imperfect information of investors with respect to either the benefit to the manager from shifting the firm's market price or the costs that she bears when biasing the report.
earnings report in pricing the firm. 
The second equilibrium condition describes the market pricing rule P , imposing 
Equilibrium Analysis
We start the analysis by investigating the fundamental proportion between the two earnings components 1 π and 2 π . For this purpose, we define the covariance ratio In such situations, the sign of λ equals the sign of 2 1 μ μ . 9 It follows thus that a negative proportion λ between the two variables 1 π and 2 π exists when they are likely to have opposite signs. This is typical of situations where one of these variables represents incomes and the other represents expenses (and thus equals the additive inverse of the expenses). A positive λ , on the other hand, captures all other situations where the two earnings components are likely to share the same sign, implying that both of them represent incomes or that both of them represent expenses. Since the manager wishes to bias incomes and expenses in opposite directions, the driving force behind our results for negative values of λ is the diversity in the manager's incentives with respect to the direction of the bias in the two earnings components. When λ is positive, the manager seeks to bias the two earnings components in the same direction, so the diversity in the manager's ability to bias the two earnings components becomes the crucial force that drives the results. Therefore, we distinguish between three cases where the proportion λ is positive: (i) , but it is decreasing in the marginal biasing costs 1 c , 2 c and 3 c .
Since investors do not observe the realization x of the random event x , they cannot precisely detect the reporting bias c c c 
. Investors rationally infer that the reporting bias preserves the fundamental proportion λ between the two earnings components. They thus attribute any deviation of the reported earnings components from their expected proportion to economic noise, so such deviation is not informative to them in detecting the reporting bias.
The benchmark equilibrium presented in Proposition 1 constitutes an important reference point when evaluating the power of disaggregated earnings data in mitigating earnings management. This is because the benchmark equilibrium appears to be the unique linear equilibrium that the model yields for any value of λ under an aggregate reporting regime, where the manager provides only the aggregate report r without detailing its components 1 r and 2 r . We formally state this result in the following corollary. 
). Any such linear equilibrium satisfies 
The explanation behind the results of Proposition 2 is the disproportional partition of the equilibrium reporting bias across the two earnings components, which distorts their
). This enables investors to utilize the reported disaggregated earnings data in reducing to some extent the exogenous noise x embedded in the reporting bias, though they are still incapable of perfectly identifying and backing out the reporting bias c c c . We thus conclude that disaggregated accounting information, via its role in imperfectly detecting the reporting bias, works to suppress managerial misreporting incentives.
We emphasize, however, that despite their restricting impact on managerial ability to engage in earnings management, disaggregated accounting data are not necessarily undesirable from the viewpoint of managers. It has been well established in the literature that managers can be worse off with the option to bias their earnings reports (see Stein 1989) . Managers might end up taking costly actions to bias their reporting even when they know that they are unable to fool the market. Managers are trapped into such inefficient behavior because they take the market's conjectures as fixed, knowing that investors will suspect their report in any case. Disaggregated accounting data might mitigate this problem, as they enable investors to better assess the reporting bias and thereby allow managers to decrease their compelled engagement in inefficient actions of earnings management.
Additional interesting insights arise when we consider the reporting bias in each of the earnings components separately. According to Proposition 2, the reporting bias in the first 
Comparative Statics Analysis
The analysis provided in the previous section highlights the importance of disaggregated accounting data in mitigating reporting manipulations, shedding light on the merits of expanded disaggregated disclosure in cases where the accounting system allows a relatively high degree of discretion in reporting. In this section, we attempt to provide accounting policy-makers with useful guidance in selecting among alternative disaggregating accounting procedures. We do so by utilizing a comparative statics analysis to investigate how the exact structure of disaggregated accounting information affects its effectiveness in detecting and suppressing earnings management.
The comparative statics analysis focuses on two equilibrium outcomes. The first is the variance of the firm's true earnings π conditional on the disaggregated earnings report, which is used to compare the effectiveness of alternative disaggregating procedures in detecting earnings management. The second is the absolute value of the overall reporting bias, which is used to compare the effectiveness of alternative disaggregating procedures in suppressing earnings management. Specifically, a lower level of the conditional variance of π implies that the disaggregating procedure is more effective in detecting earnings management. Similarly, a lower absolute value of the overall reporting bias implies that the disaggregating procedure is more effective in suppressing earnings management. We analyze the sensitivity of these two equilibrium outcomes to the modeling parameters λ and is always indicative about the reporting bias, regardless of the biasing costs 1 c and 2 c , improving the informational quality of the disaggregated earnings report in pricing the firm and reducing the managerial misreporting incentives. This sheds light on the merits of disaggregating accounting procedures that decompose earnings into pureincome and pure-expense components. However, the dependence of the equilibrium outcomes on λ takes a rather complicated shape when λ is negative, which does not enable us to provide clear-cut comparative statics results for negative values of λ . This is due to the existence of two forces that are at work when λ is negative. The first is the diversity in the manager's incentives regarding to the direction of the bias in the two components and the second is the diversity in the manager's abilities to bias the two components. This is unlike the case of a positive λ , where the manager wishes to bias the two earnings components in the same direction, so the only force at work is the diversity in her ability to bias the two components.
We now turn to analyzing the sensitivity of the equilibrium outcomes to the extent to which the fundamental proportion between the earnings components 1 π and 2 π is noisy, as suggests that accounting standards setters should seek to decompose earnings into components that fundamentally exhibit the most stable proportions.
Empirical Implications
Assessing the usefulness of accounting earnings to investors has been the focus of numerous empirical studies. Our study contributes to this line of research by providing a rational explanation for the effect of earnings management on the association between stock prices and accounting earnings. In particular, our analysis points out to a potential misspecification in empirical models commonly used in the literature. More specifically, it follows from Proposition 2 that including the aggregate earnings measure is especially large when the regression model is applied to firms that exhibit less noisy proportions between their earnings components.
In addition to the empirical predictions regarding the way investors utilize disaggregated earnings data in detecting earnings management and in pricing firms, our study provides testable empirical predictions with respect to the managerial tendency to engage in earnings management. Proposition 4 predicts a lower level of earnings management for firms that are characterized by less noisy proportions between their earnings components. A lower level of earnings management is also expected in firms that provide more detailed disclosures on the components of earnings. Similarly, our study predicts a reduction in earnings management following the issuance of an accounting standard that mandates additional disclosure on the components of earnings (for example, mandating segment disclosures of sales and operating income).
Empirical examination of our predictions requires the careful design of proxies for the economic relationships between different earnings components. Financial ratios seem natural candidates for this role. Particular attention should be given, however, to the fact that financial ratios are measured using reported earnings data rather than the underlying (unobservable) true earnings data. This problem could be mitigated by averaging the financial ratios of firms over several reporting periods, provided that deviations of the reported earnings items from the corresponding true earnings items mean-revert over time. The theory developed in our study points to financial ratios that involve only income statement components, such as net profit margin, operating profit margin, gross profit margin, and effective tax rate. Nevertheless, financial ratios based on balance sheet line items, such as asset turnover, might be employed in empirical analysis as well. This is so because of the linkage between the income statement and the balance sheet. In particular, any item that appears in the income statement is associated with a change in balance sheet items. A similar argument can be applied to financial ratios that involve items from the cash flow statement, as these ratios capture relationships between cashbased earnings components and accrual-based earnings components.
While most of our analytical results have not been directly tested, there is empirical evidence consistent with our predictions. For example, in their recent study, Hirst, Koonce and Venkataraman (2007) find that disaggregation in management earnings forecasts enhances their credibility. Consistent with our predicted pricing rule, Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) argue that the deviation of the effective tax rate (measured as income tax expense divided by pre-tax income) from the statutory tax rate is a sign of lower earnings quality. Also, Ohlson and Penman (1992) find that different components of earnings have different valuation coefficients, but these coefficients converge in magnitude as earnings are accumulated over a sufficiently long period of time. They attribute this result to the diversity in the measurement errors embedded in different earnings components, which diminishes as the time window becomes longer. Our study provides a slightly different interpretation of their result, suggesting that diversity in the ability to manage the different earnings components might be the reason for their different valuation coefficients. Over a long period of time, if earnings management is mean-reverting, the difference in valuation coefficients shrinks. In the context of our model, diversity in the ability to manage the different earnings components might also be the reason for the empirical evidence documenting that investors place a higher value on the cash components of earnings than on accrual-based earnings components (see Sloan 1996) .
Concluding Remarks
This paper highlights accounting disaggregation as a powerful tool in detecting and suppressing earnings management. It suggests that expanded disaggregated accounting disclosure is especially advantageous in cases where accounting standards allow management to select among several reporting alternatives. In cases where the reporting discretion is substantial, restrictions on the use of materiality considerations might also be recommended in order to avoid the withholding of information that can assist in mitigating earnings management. The analysis also offers guidance to accounting policy-makers in selecting among alternative accounting disaggregating procedures. In particular, it demonstrates that disaggregated earnings information is most effective in mitigating earnings management when its components are most tightly proportional to each other due to their fundamental economic nature. The analysis further points to the merits of decomposing the earnings report into pureincome and pure-expense components, or alternatively -decomposing it into components that are very different in the extent to which their reporting can be manipulated.
While our study sheds light on considerations that could be important to accounting standards setters in selecting the proper accounting disaggregation procedure, these considerations obviously should be regarded in the context of other considerations that are not analyzed in this study. They should be viewed, for example, in light of the differences in the proprietary costs implied by different disaggregating accounting procedures. They should be also viewed in light of the differences in the likelihood of different kinds of disaggregated data to be voluntarily disclosed by managers even in the absence of mandatory requirements (see
Einhorn 2005).
We also emphasize that the conclusions drawn from our analysis only pertain to disaggregated information that details additive line items of an aggregate accounting measure, such as incomes and expenses that are accumulated into the net earnings measure. These conclusions do not necessarily hold, however, with respect to other types of detailed accounting data. Dye and Sridhar (2003) , for example, consider accounting information that details the substitutable (non-additive) objective and subjective measures on which a single summary accounting datum is based, such as the historical cost and the fair value measures that underlie the familiar Lower Cost or Market accounting measurement. They demonstrate circumstances where this kind of detailed accounting data could enhance managerial misreporting incentives, rather than suppress them, because more weight is attached to subjective measures.
Our results are consistent with extant empirical evidence. In addition, the results offer hitherto unidentified empirical predictions with regard to the way that investors utilize disaggregated earnings data and ratio analysis in detecting earnings management when pricing firms. They also provide interesting testable predictions with regard to the managerial tendency to engage in earnings management. In a companion paper, we provide empirical evidence that support our predictions.
APPENDIX
Using symmetry considerations, we assume throughout the appendix that 
As a basis for the proofs of Propositions 1-4, we state and prove Lemmata 1-6. Proof of Lemma 1. We look for equilibrium with a linear pricing function. Thus, we assume there exist scalars α , β and γ , such that 
. Hence, the optimal reporting biases in the two earnings components are c c c 
, and thus v satisfies the equation 
is decreasing in both v and λ (when λ is positive), so
is decreasing in v and increasing in λ , and given that . Hence, it follows from
. Since 
